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Principal agent problems arise frequently in situations of interdependence.  Europe, 
with its various arrangements, is replete with principal agent problems that are 
mediated by institutions at various levels.  While issues of water and land can provide 
a convenient focus, the essential problem is a deeper one.    
 
Decision making in principal agent situations has traditionally been considered in 
only a limited way.  Current agency approaches seek to orient the interests of agents 
to those of the principal.  More generalised formulations experience difficulties in 
reconciling interests.  This is apparent not only in two-party forms but even more so 
in three-part(y) ones.  In n-party environments things may appear to become simpler 
as n increases, but the problem may remain. 
 
An innovative exploration of a principal-agent situation which uses object-based 
concepts and simulations is presented in this paper.  Different patterns of agent 
commitment are seen when it is applied to a European context.   
 
Suitable reconceptualisation of agency theory appears to have wide implications and 
applications.  Its further development will allow more adequate specification of 
agency situations with immediate implications for policy and practice not only in 
Europe but in nations and regions around the world. 
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Europe, with its various arrangements and interdependencies, is replete with principal 
agent problems that are mediated by institutions at various levels.  Issues of water and 
land can provide a convenient focus, particularly the former where streams and 
catchments pysically embed interdependencies with no regard to borders.  However 
the essential problem is a wide one, as can be illustrated by considerations of financial 
accounting harmonisation.  Long standing efforts have seen limited harmonisation 
results.  Complementary management of land and water may well be more difficult.  
 
The essential question is a deep one: how might different agents (and agencies) 
resolve their principals’ interests?  If principals were uniform, consistent, clearly 
communicating and otherwise perfect there would still be a problem due to the role 
and position of agency.  In reality, principals are none of these things.  However, for 
convenience we will here assume that they might be for it is the agency situation that 
is of interest.   
 
Agents are separate and differently positioned parties to principals.  They may have 
their own interests, information, perspectives, institutions, access and other 
arrangements.  Various asymmetries exist between principal and agent.  Such things 
can be variously captured in a formulation.  They can also be seen in the ways that 
agents react to a common stimulus, as in the ways that National Governments 
implement an EU Directive.    Different patterns of agent commitment are seen in the 
case scenario, the EU financial accounting harmonisation process.   
 
Formulating and simulating such a situation involves an innovative exploration of the 
principal-agent situation using object-based concepts.  Some findings from a simple 
specification are presented in this paper.   Results show differences between different 
EU groups and between EU9 and EU15 outcomes. Further development will allow 
more adequate specification of agency situations with immediate implications for 
policy and practice not only in Europe but in other nations and regions.  
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2.  Casting agents and contexts 
 
A very limited form of agency, that of the self-interested rationalist, has been in 
common use (1.1).  An alternative form is that of the socio-environmental rational 
agent (1.2).  This alternative form when used in EU contexts allows a more 
comprehensive consideration of how National agents might react to EU Directives 
(1.3). 
 
2.1  The Self Interested Rationalist, SIR  
 
In the simplest of agency models, the agency relationship is reduced to two 
characters: the principal and the agent.  The agency relationship is a contract in which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to take 
actions on his/her behalf which involves the delegation of some decision-making 
authority to the agent to achieve some pre-determined goal(s) (Jensen and Meckling 
1994).  The agent will then assume responsibility by expending effort and executing 
actions (i.e. decision making in an uncertain environment) to meet his or her 
commitment towards attaining the principal’s goal(s).  In doing so, the agent will 
generate and obtain valuable information required by the principal.  The principal will 
reward the agent for attaining the goal(s) specified in the contract and hence, 
finalising its commitment.   
 
The agent to the relationship, however, is assumed to be a utility maximiser, a self-
interested rationalist, SIR. Thus, it is assumed to use the incidence of information 
asymmetry
1 for its own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 5).  That is, the agent 
will select those actions that are in its interests given the compensation scheme 
offered by the principal.  This does not align with the interests of the principal unless 
the principal incurs the costs of monitoring the agent’s behaviour and/or aligning 
agent incentives with those of the principal so that information is not manipulated.   
                                                 
1 The information possessed by the agent is valuable but unavailable to the market and principal, 
without which the market cannot identify the true nature of the activities (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 
1981: 9).  This inequivalent distribution of information is termed the incidence of information 
asymmetry (Butterworth, 1987: 187).   
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While agency problems are taken to exist in all organisations and in all cooperative 
efforts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 7; Jefferies and Johnson, 2002: 2), the 
assumption of self-interested rationalist (SIR) behaviour has had limiting 
consequences.  The model correctly predicts particular phenomena under 
investigation in only the simplest of instances, and even in the simplest of instances 
there are cases where the simple agency model has limited success (Temel 2005).  
While the hypothesis of self-interested rationalist (SIR) behaviour may be apt in some 
contexts it may be misleading or inadequate in others.  This is especially so when the 
narrow interpretations of self-interested rationalism are used in agency.   
 
2.2  The Socio-Environmental Rational Agent, SERA 
 
An extended conceptualisation of agent behaviour is introduced in Temel (2005).   
This addresses the context of agent behaviour, the socio-environment, within which 
the agent interacts.  The context particularly refers to the institutional affiliations and 
interactions of the agent.   Each individual is shaped and moulded in accordance with 
their socio-environment.  That is, each individual’s interpretation of their socio-
environment and involvement in that socio-environment will influence their identity.  
Individuals may then use rational calculations in selecting what aspect will influence 
their identities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 410).  Rationality can, thus, also be 
informed by the socio-environment and not just by self-interest.  An individual (in 
some practical sense) can be rational and yet justify and/or undertake actions with 
other motivations, impulses, interests or needs in mind.   
 
Self-interested rationality may be intended but it may not necessarily always be 
achieved.  There are clearly wider social factors at play in the rationality of 
individuals (Tankersley, 2000).  It is thus probable to suggest that in making decisions 
or performing activities individuals use their socio-environmentally-constructed 
rationality.  The agent is now assumed to use their socio-environmental rationality 
transmitted via their institutional involvement to reason and make decisions (Temel 
(2005)).  The potential of institutional affiliation and interaction lies in its ability to 
complement rational choice theories by showing how belief systems affect individual 
(agent) behaviour (Temel (2005)).  It is through affiliating and interacting with these Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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institutions that an individual’s beliefs about the state of the environment are 
influenced and hence, their behaviour accordingly.  This influence will vary from 
individual to individual depending upon the extent or level of their affiliations and 
interactions, which is informed by the power and variability of the institutional 
influence.  This agent is termed a socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA), 
which can be contrasted with the self-interested rationalist (SIR) agent in the existing 
agency literature.      
 
2.3  The European Union (EU): a Context for Agency 
 
In the context of the EU, the citizens of Europe can be considered the principals and 
each of the respective member nations’ governments are the ultimate agents.  The 
citizens engage their governments to act on their behalf towards achieving a common 
European market for goods, services, labour and capital via an electoral contract (an 
initial referendum and national election), which transfers the delegation of decision 
making authority to the national governments.  It is, however, difficult for citizens 
themselves to monitor the behaviour of national governments.  EU organisations (e.g., 
EU Commission, EU Council, and EU Parliament) are employed to do so – much like 
the shareholders and board of directors’ scenario in the context of a corporation.  The 
EU case is a case of multiple agents and dual parties.  The European Commission is 
the dual party
2: it is both an agent to the citizens (the principals) and a principal to the 
member nations (the agents).  This is depicted in Figure 1 below, which presents the 
application of this multi-agent dual party relationship within the context of the EU.   
                                                 
2 A dual party is a party that can represent both a principals and agents.  The EU Commission as an 
agent to EU citizens (the principals) it has the responsibility to administer and monitor the 
implementation of the EU Financial Accounting Directives on behalf of the EU citizens (Harris, 2000: 
54).  As a principal to national members (the agents) it provides the necessary resources (i.e., some 
monetary funding, a forum and legislative backing) for the national governments – who are expected to 
have the resources, ability, knowledge and the skills to employ them – to achieve the goal of financial 
















Source: Temel 2005: 94 
 
The focus will be upon the relationship between the EU commission and member nations 
(the lower portion of Figure 1).  Once the citizens of each member nation agree to join 
the EU they hand over their collective welfare in nominated areas to the EU Commission 
to act on their behalf.  The transactional process between the EU Commission and 
member nations then commences. 
 
In the first transactional process (labelled 1 in Figure 1), the EU Commission provides 
the necessary resources (the incentives, the forum and common legislative backing) to the 
national governments to achieve the goal of financial accounting harmonisation.     Each 
member state has control of the resources and is delegated the responsibility of ensuring 
that their behaviour (i.e., employment of resources) adheres to the goals and the ethos of 
the EU (presented in Article 52 to 58, and especially Article 54(3)(g)) of the Treaty of 
Rome 1957).  Therefore, in the second transactional process (labelled 2 in Figure 1), each 
member state contracts to adhere to the policies set up to ensure that a common European 
market for goods, services, labour and capital is established and equivalent safeguards are 
provided.  Finally, in the last transactional process (labelled 3 in Figure 1), each member 
state is provided with a reward for adhering to such policies and committing to the goals 
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access to benefits brought about by union such as the increased flow of goods, services, 
labour and capital between member nations.   
 
Once integration begins, member states would find that progress towards greater 
integration would facilitate the pursuit of their own goals. These states would then 
pressure their governments to take further steps towards integration. The additional steps 
would in turn stimulate further pressure for more steps, and the process would continue.  
Should the EU environment continue to be framed in the traditional agency sense each 
member state would be expected to adopt and adhere to the financial accounting policies 
within the Directives that maximise their own utility and to reject those that do not.   
 
2.4  SERA in the EU 
 
Should the EU case, on the other hand, be framed in the context of socio-environmental 
rationalism, it is expected that the behaviour of respective member nations (the agents) 
would reflect their institutional settings.  Institutions are the instruments of the interaction 
influencing agent behaviour in the principal-agent relationship.  Hence, the agents 
(member nations) rather than adopting and adhering to financial accounting policies 
representative of their self-interest, will adopt and adhere to those policies in accordance 
with their institutional setting.  Figure 2 below depicts and explains the application of the 
socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA) behaviour to the EU–Nation context.  Each 
member nation after initiation of the collective transaction (labelled 0 in Figure 2) 
engages with their national institutional settings (demonstrated by the arrows labelled 1 
and 2 in Figure 2) regarding the type of behaviour to be presented.  This then influences 
each respective nations belief structures (labelled 3 and 4 in Figure 2), and finally their 
commitment towards harmonisation (labelled 5 in Figure 2).  In summary, the 
institutional force present within the principal-agent relationships (EU Commission and 
member nation relationship) acts on the agents, influencing their behaviour positively or 
negatively towards the attainment of the principal’s goal(s) through their belief structure. 
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Source: Temel 2005: 182 
 
The following sections will now focus on the broader context of the interaction.  This 
involves an examination of the EU financial accounting harmonisation process in light of 
self-interested rationalist (SIR) agent and socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA) 
conceptualisations.       
 




The historical origin of accounting regulations in Europe, being the legal prescription or 
the professional governing of accounting, can be traced back to 17
th Century France 
(Gulin, Ferdo, Vasicek and Lajos, 2002: 3). Through the Napoleonic Wars French 
mandatory requirements (Napoleon's Trade Law from 1807 prescribed the obligation to 
draft the balance sheet and the profit and loss account as per the Code de Commerce) 
were transported through to continental Europe.  This was the beginning of accounting 
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After the hostilities of World Wars I and II, the Treaty of Rome 1957 established the 
European Community (EC now named the European Union, EU) and initiated the 
comings of the harmonisation of the national regulations.  While being the second 
historical phase of financial accounting harmonisation in Europe, it represented the 
beginnings of EU financial accounting harmonisation.   
 
EU Member States agreed to harmonise their company laws ‘to co-ordinate the 
safeguards’ contained therein ‘for the protection of the interests of members and others 
… with a view to making such safeguards equivalent’ (Treaty of Rome Article 52 to 58, 
and especially Article 54(3)(g)).   This agreement stemmed from an understanding that, 
stakeholders and business activities could benefit from the harmonisation of corporate 
laws and regulations governing financial accounting rather than through confinement to 
their national regulations.  Confinement was thought to be prejudicial to the workings of 
a common European capital market giving rise to not only interpretation and analytical 
problems, financing and compliance costs for European multinationals, but also 
inequivalent safeguards for European multinationals.   
 
In the 1970s, the European Commission formally attempted to reduce national variations 
in corporate regulations through the harmonisation of financial accounting standards 
(Joy, 1996: 17).  Harmonisation was to be achieved through all member states 
implementing a series of Company Law Directives
3 issued by the Commission.  The 
framework and details of these Directives initially resting heavily upon the Germanic 
approach to financial accounting were later redrafted to the Anglo-Saxon approach to 
accommodate the arrival of the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland as new members in the 
EU (Walton, Haller and Raffournier, 1998: 14; Walton 1997; Diggle and Nobes 1994; 
Nobes, 1993: 165).     Although these Directives have been implemented in every EU 
member state, a harmonised European financial accounting system is yet to develop.   
                                                 
3 A Directive is legislation binding on all EU member states, requiring incorporation into national law 
(Harris, 1999: 58).  The incorporation of the EU Directives into national law is a complex, lengthy process, 
the method of implementation being left to the discretion of national authorities (Choi, Frost and Meek: 
1999: 267).  The Directives provide the framework for implementation wherein member states may 
exercise flexibility in applying national accounting standards and may add additional requirements where 
appropriate (Iqbal, Melcher and Elmallah, 1997: 22).  Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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Significant variations in accounting rules and practices still exist in European countries, 
in part because of national interpretations in implementation. 
 
3.2  Financial Accounting Harmonisation in the EU  
 
 
The EU Commission has attempted to achieve harmonisation through the issuance of 
Company Law Directives
4.  Of the Directives, the Fourth Directive and Seventh Directive 
deal exclusively with financial accounting issues and standards, and are also the most 
controversial of the Directives.  According to Walton, Haller and Raffournier (1998: 14) 
the EU Directives were inadequate in integrating the mixture of principles and practices 
drawn from different countries and different traditions towards a common basis.   
 
One particular experience open to examination relates to the adoption of the ‘true and fair 
view’
5.  The adoption of the ‘true and fair view indicates a diversity of responses with 
inadequate attempts to integrate or standardise European practices.  Given the underlying 
assumption of agent behaviour in the existing Agency literature (i.e., self-interested 
rationalism) nations should not adopt the policy given its inadequate representation of 
member states’ financial accounting practices.  Alternatively, given the assumptions of 
socio-environmental rationalism member nations should adopt the ‘true and fair view’ 
that is in accordance with their institutional settings.  Actual practices show clear national 
interpretations of a posited common European standard.  So what informed this adoption: 
self-interested rationalism or socio-environmental rationalism?   
    
The ‘true and fair view’ concept originated in the UK and represented a significant 
departure from the previous draft requiring the more common Germanic approach 
                                                 
4 Note that the EU has used ‘Directives’ (where nations interpret and legislate) rather than ‘regulations’ 
(where nations uniformly implement).  The former are ‘European framework laws’ while the latter are 
‘European laws’ under the proposed new constitution (McDonald and Deardon: 2005: 33).  Clearly agency 
issues and problems are much more likely or feasible with Directives. 
5 The ‘true and fair view’ is a requirement that the financial statements be prepared in accordance with and 
present a ‘true and fair view’ of the financial operations and position of the enterprise.  Any application of 
the provisions of the directives which do not represent a ‘true and fair view’ are to be overridden or 
departed from, and an alternative procedure which represents a ‘true and fair view’ is to be adopted (Article 
2(5) of the Fourth Directive).    Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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(Walton 1997; Diggle and Nobes 1994), which required financial statements to conform 
and adhere to the legal principles of proper bookkeeping (Nobes, 1993: 165).  Essentially, 
the ‘true and fair view’ is a highly subjective concept requiring the exercise of 
professional judgment on behalf of the accountant or auditor (Walton, 1995: 217).  While 
being officially recognised in the documents, there is no interpretation of its meaning in 
the statutes or the Directives, nor has it been the subject of judicial interpretation (cf., the 
German approach which encompasses the use of rigid and detailed rules and regulations 
as a basis for account preparation) (Gray and Coenenberg, 1984: 101).  Consequently, the 
‘true and fair’ concept has been interpreted in different ways in different EU member 
countries, both linguistically and philosophically (Alexander and Nobes, 1994: 105).   
 
This implies that a number of different financial statements could give a ‘true and fair 
view’ of any particular state of affairs or profit or loss, frustrating harmonisation efforts 
in the EU.  This is neither in the self-interests of the nations (agents) nor the EU 
Commission (principal), as it creates disharmony and may impede investment and capital 
flow between nations.  The question here is why are nations opting not to adopt the ‘true 
and fair view’ in its entirety, even though it is a lax requirement (allowing a substantial 
degree of flexibility) through which its implementation would improve harmonisation 
efforts.  An application of the existing assumptions of Agency theory would suggest that 
it would be in the best self-interest of agents (member nations or national governments) 
to do so.  Applying standards with regards to their institutional settings may be a possible 
explanation?        
 
The ‘true and fair view’ is not the only aspect of the Directives that has been applied in 
diversity.  Standards that are stipulated by the EU Commission for implementation have 
been circumvented and the alternatives to the stipulated policy have been adopted.  Under 
the Fourth Directive alone, there are more than 30 optional areas that provide alternative 
ways of implementation (Joy, 1996: 19).  Similarly, options exist in the Seventh Directive 
on Group Accounts in areas such as: the definition of a subsidiary/concept of a group; 
exemptions from consolidation; valuation methods across group accounts; research and Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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development (R&D) and the recognition of goodwill
6.  This is only a limited sample, as 
according to Gray, Coenenberg and Gordon (1993: 35) there are fifty-one obvious 
options.  If they are all assumed to be yes/no options, Gray, Coenenberg and Gordon 
(1993: 35) extrapolate that this means there are 2
51, that is, ‘two zillion’, ways of 
implementing the Seventh Directive.   
 
The most controversial topic of the Seventh Directive is the concept/definition of a group.  
The concept/definition of a group for consolidation purposes was not formalised in the 
text of the Directive (Flower and Lefebvre, 1997: 343).  The term ‘group’ is not 
mentioned and instead a number of conditions for the preparation of consolidated 
accounts are specified.  These conditions relate to the legal concept of control
7.  Member 
states, however, may choose to go beyond this mandatory provision, and consolidate 
accounts in accordance with the optional concept of economic control
8.  Each member 
state may tailor its requirements by choosing certain options and rejecting others, 
incorporating certain aspects of the legal concept of control and some or all aspects of the 
economic concept of control.   
 
For example, with the early development of the stock exchange in the UK, the 
requirements emphasise the existence of a de jure (legal power) to control through share 
ownership.  In Germany, with a greater portion of corporations subject to family 
ownership and extensive banking facilities, the requirements emphasise the existence of 
de facto (economic) management control (Radebaugh and Gray, 1997: 257).  Some 
                                                 
6 Goodwill is the difference between the cost of the investment to the parent and the value of the 
subsidiary’s net assets at the time the investment is purchased.  Goodwill arises when the parent pays a 
premium for acquiring the shares of the subsidiary (Newham, 1984: 65).  That is, the parent company 
anticipates greater benefits than fair market value of net assets acquired for example, an added team of 
executives will bring about a major synergy or certain patents lend themselves to higher profit potential 
(Mueller, Gernon and Meek, 1997: 25). 
7 Article 1.1 of the Seventh Directive requires consolidation where the parent undertaking has the ‘legal 
power to control’ the subsidiary, which is presumed to exit in four cases: (1) the holding of the majority of 
the voting rights; (2) the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of members; (3) the right to 
exercise dominant influence pursuant to a contract or provision in the articles of association; and (4) the 
holding of a majority of the voting rights pursuant to an agreement with the shareholders (Flower and 
Lefebvre, 1997: 348). 
8 Article 1.2 of the Seventh Directive stipulates economic control exists if a parent undertaking has a 
participating interest in the subsidiary and either: (a) the parent actually exercises a dominant influence on 
the subsidiary company; or (b) the subsidiary and parent undertaking are managed on a unified basis 
(Flower and Lefebvre, 1997: 349). Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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countries have been more imaginative than others in their interpretation of the Directive 
in that their interpretation have given rise to various ways in which the boundaries of a 
group may be demarcated (Radebaugh and Gray, 1997: 343).    At this present time, no 
two countries apart from the UK and Ireland have an identical accounting group concept 
(Radebaugh and Gray, 1997: 343).  This provides a clear demonstration of the key role 
that institutions can play in influencing the behaviour of member nations, as agents in EU 
principal-agent relationships.    
        
According to the principles of the existing theory of Agency, each EU member nation 
being an agent is a self-interested rationalist (SIR) seeking to adopt those policies that 
maximise national utility.  Given this, nations should then undertake those actions that 
would increase their share of the rewards of economic union such as, increased capital 
mobility and efficiency, and increased investment and comparability.  These rewards 
could only eventuate through the implementation of a harmonised financial accounting 
system.  The degree of diversity continuing to persist in EU financial accounting 
(demonstrated in the discussions above) does not reinforce or support the notion that 
member nations are acting in accordance with such a simple mode of self-interested 
rationalism.  Diversity is not in the best interests of member nations (the agents) or the 
EU citizens (the nominal principals).  Why would some nations depart from the stipulated 
standards to adopt alternatives that increase diversity in EU financial accounting, which 
are contrary to the apparent interests and utility of both agents and principals?  An 
examination of the ‘true and fair view’ and the definition of a ‘group’ demonstrate that 
institutional
9 influence may be instrumental in member nation behaviour.  This is 
examined further in the context of agency. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The relevance of institutions in understanding accounting policy choices and adoption is supported in an 
earlier study by Temel (2000) which demonstrates that societal institutions were the social channels 
through which cultural values were transmitted to the accounting system and hence, the driving force for 
the diverse adoption of EU Directives (Temel 2000). Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
  14
4. Implementing SERA using an Object Orientated Approach 
 
 
The research presented is conceptual and theoretical in nature with an extended case 
application.  It applies the existing and extended conceptualisation of agent behaviour in 




Such a focus will, however, require the adoption of a non-traditional research 
methodology10.  This methodology focuses on examining the object and its context (i.e., 
the agent and its environment), and not just on the defined predictive capability of the 
object’s (agent’s) behaviour.  A methodology that adopts this approach is the object-
orientated (OO) methodology.  In light of this research an OO approach aids: 
1.  Conceptualisation of the object’s concepts, 
2.  Development of a model of the constructs of the conceptualisation, i.e., a frame of 
application, and 
3.  Implementation and evaluation of the conceptualisation of the object.   
 
An OO method that implements this approach is simulation.  Simulation involves 
constructing a dynamic model of a real system for the purpose of experimentation 
(Edwards, 1992: 45).  The EU as an agency relationship is a state of the real world that 
will be portrayed through the process of simulation.  The context of the relationship will 
be manipulated to explore and infer about agent (member nation) behaviour in the 
relationship and the contextual influence itself.   
 
The EU financial accounting harmonisation process represents a simulation of multiple-
cases.  The multiple cases are of member nations (multiple-agents) in their differing 
accounting contexts.    The simulation of this multiple-case will allow for cross-case 
                                                 
10 The principal agent problem has been extensively developed in a particular paradigm, one influenced by 
positivism.  The positive-agency literature has generally been empirically orientated, focusing essentially 
on predictability.  This approach has dominated research in the theory of Agency (Jensen and Smith, 1985: 
2).  For example, a substantial portion of the literature in agency has focused on the predictive capability 
and objectivity as criteria for judging the usefulness of the theory.   Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
  15
analysis from multiple perspectives, approaches and data.   The data utilised in this 
application process consists of secondary data which may exhibit both quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics.  Examples of data that utilised include: legal standards and 
requirements, parliamentarian debates, speeches written agreements.  Simulation 
outcome data, the results generated from the simulation, also constitute research data.  
Presentation of simulation results is both visual and quantitative.     
 
4.2  Simulation Procedure  
 
Simulation through the use of computational software is conducted.  The chosen software 
package for this research is NetLogo.
11  In the simulation, agents are presented with 
variations in their institutional environment: 
 
•  InstnPow, institutional power possessed by institutions, and  
•  InstnUncern, uncertainty/variability in institutional influence. 
 
These affect their level of commitment towards achieving the principal’s goal.   
 
There are four agent groups in this simulation, each one representing the accounting 
systems operating within the EU.  These agent groups are the:  
1.  Anglo Saxon Agent Group  
2.  Germanic Agent Group 
3.  Latin Agent Group, and  
4.  Nordic Agent Group. 
    
The simulation consists of a minimum of nine agents representing the initial nine EU 
members and is labelled the pre-expansion phase in EU membership.  The maximum 
number is 15 agents representing the later six adjoining members and is labelled the first 
                                                 
11 NetLogo is an agent-based parallel modelling and simulation environment produced by the Centre for 
Connected Learning and Computer-based modelling at Northwestern University (Evans, Heuvelink and 
Nettle, 2003: 1).  It is a programmable modelling environment for simulating complex natural and social 
phenomena developing or emerging over time (Johnson, 2001: 165).   Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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post-expansion phase in EU membership.  The simulation is therefore run twice: part 1 
represents the pre-expansion phase in EU membership (or EU9), and part 2 represents the 
first post-expansion phase in EU membership (EU15).   
 
The simulation involves a replication of the world with conditions set by the researcher 
using sliders.  The sliders set much of the environment in which the agent interacts and 
deliberates about its behaviour.  Given the set conditions the simulation is programmed to 
generate a possible reflection of agent behaviour that may result if the set conditions 
occurred in the world.  The results obtained therein are compared and contrasted to the 
agent’s actual behaviour in the real world (demonstrated by the directional arrow feeding 
forward to the real world in Figure 3).  This is their existing commitment towards 
achieving the principal’s goal given the state of their real world.  
 
Figure 3 – Operation of Simulation  
 
Source: Temel (2005: 220) 
 
 
The workings of the simulation can therefore be summarised by a relationship:  
 
C   ~  R (P)  given D# 
 
That is, the communication of final commitment is dependent upon an agent’s reactions 

















A matrix of institutional dimensions, presented in Figure 4, is used to analyse the 
contours developed from the results.  This matrix presents a measure of institutionally 
influential societies based upon the extent of influential power exerted by institutions 
(InstnPow), and the extent of uncertainty or variability in institutional influence 
(InstnUncern).  These institutional variables were used in the simulation to vary the 
environmental conditions (over a range, nominally 0 to 100) of the agent.   
 
The type of society pertaining to the coordinates of the intersecting variables is written 
into the corners of the quadrants square where the coordinates are located.  The points 
towards the corners exhibit a stronger association to the assigned society type.  The area 
towards the centre exhibits a weaker association to the assigned society types, and is 
labelled the intermediate area.  A matrix quadrant is assigned to each agent group given 
their institutional setting at the pre-expansion and post-expansion phase of EU 
membership (refer to Figure 4).  This matrix represents the box plot floor of the 3D 
contour graph at   y = 0.  Therefore, only the portion of the contour contained within the 
assigned quadrant of the box plot will be analysed. 
 
Having identified the areas of the contours to be analysed for each agent group it is now 
necessary to examine the contours themselves.  Two particular agent groups have been 
selected for analysis: the Anglo-Saxon Agent Group and the Latin Agent Group.      






(100,50)  (100,100) 
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Figure 4 - Agent Positioning within the Matrix of Institutional Dimensions 
 
 








Source: Temel (2005: 265) 
 
 
5.  Simulation results 
 
The commitment of EU groups for varying levels of insitutional influence was simulated.  
Distinctive results for Anglo-Saxon and Latin Groups in the EU9 and EU 15 are reported 
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InstnUncern  InstnUncern 
(0,50)
❶ Anglo Saxon Agent Group at 9 Nations (pre-expansion) 
❷ Germanic Agent Group at 9 Nations (pre-expansion) 
➌ Latin Agent Group at 9 Nations (pre-expansion) 
➍ Nordic Agent Group at 9 Nations (pre-expansion)  
➎ Anglo Saxon Agent Group at 15 Nations (post-expansion) 
➏ Germanic Agent Group at 15 Nations (post-expansion) 
➐ Latin Agent Group at 15 Nations (post-expansion) 
➑ Nordic Agent Group at 15 Nations (post-expansion) Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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5.1  Visualisation and Analysis of the Anglo-Saxon Agent Group  
 
Final commitment values given the InstnPow and InstnUncern coordinates for the EU9 
and EU15 simulation are shown for the Anglo-Saxon agent group in Figure 5.  The 
analysis begins with the examination of the coordinates of the ‘upheaval in society’ (U) 
and the areas surrounding these coordinates.  The peaks protruding from the bottom view 
of this division appear numerous in number (Figure 5a).  The overall behaviour of the 
agent within this division therefore has an inclination towards negative commitment.   
These results are synonymous with the agent’s stance towards harmonisation upon 
initiating membership with the EU.  While the Anglo-Saxon agent group at the time 
could see the benefits of harmonisation, they were unable to entrust their system to 
foreign standards and hence, enforced the introduction of standards suitable to their 
system.  Hence, there is the overall portrayal of negative commitment in the examined 
quadrant.    
 
The coordinates that require closer examination for the Anglo-Saxon agent group after 
the first post-expansion phase relates to the coordinates of a ‘controlled society’ (C) and 
the areas surrounding these coordinates.  The peaks protruding from the top view of the 
division are clearly more numerous in number (Figure 5b).  The overall behaviour of the 
agent within this division therefore has an inclination towards positive commitment, 
which is the exact opposite of the overall behaviour presented in the pre-expansion phase 
of EU membership (see Figure 5, and above).  These results are synonymous with the 
agent’s current stance towards harmonisation within the EU.  The improved strength and 
stability of the UK and the ongoing success of the EU (demonstrated by the expansion in 
EU membership) fostered the development of a positive attitude towards harmonisation 
and hence, the maintenance of a positive level of commitment.   Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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Figure 5  3D Contour Graph of the Anglo Saxon Agent Group Commitment Values at its 
Intersecting InstnPow and InstnUncern Values 
A  Part 1 EU9  Inverted 
 
B   Part 2 EU15 
 
Source: Temel 2005: 268, 270 
 
 
What the above analysis has demonstrated is that an agent group’s commitment levels 
can be altered by variations in the InstnPow and InstnUncern variables.  In the first post-
expansion phase of EU membership the increased stability and strength of institutional 
settings enable the exhibition of a positive default commitment.  The presence of a 
number of positive and negative peaks, and the variability of the peaks demonstrate that 
changes and variations in the InstnPow and InstnUncern variables affect the commitment 
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5.2  Visualisation and Analysis of the Latin Agent Group  
 
The contour graphs in Figure 6 represent the Latin agent group’s final commitment 
values given the InstnPow and InstnUncern coordinates.  The analysis will begin with the 
examination of the coordinates of the ‘reforming society’ (R) and the areas surrounding 
these coordinates.  The peaks protruding from the top view of this division are clearly 
more numerous in number (Figure 6a).  There is in fact a positive trend with limited 
negative escapes.  The overall behaviour of the agent within this division therefore is of 
positive commitment.  This parallels the agent group’s stance towards harmonisation 
upon initiating membership with the EU.  This particular agent group consists of France 
the initiator of and solicitor for unification across Europe.  Hence, it is expected that there 
should be the exposition of a strong positive commitment.  
 
The coordinates that now require closer examination for the Latin agent group after the 
first post-expansion phase relate to the coordinates of an ‘atomistic society’ (A) and the 
areas surrounding these coordinates.  The peaks protruding from the top view of the 
division are also clearly more numerous in number (Figure 6b).  The overall behaviour of 
the agent within this division therefore also has an inclination towards positive 
commitment, which supports the behaviour presented in the pre-expansion phase of EU 
membership (Figure 6a, and as discussed above).  This is synonymous with the agent’s 
ongoing stance towards harmonisation within the EU.    
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Figure 1 - 3D Contour Graph of the Latin Agent Group Commitment Values at its Intersecting 
InstnPow and InstnUncern Values 
 
A Part 1 EU9 
 
B  Part 2  EU15 
 
Source: Temel 2005, 272 and 274 
 
This and other analyses demonstrate that an agent group’s commitment levels can be 
altered by variations in the InstnPow and InstnUncern variables.  In the post-expansion 
phase of EU membership the easing of speculation and the introduction of supporting 
members into the group further supported the maintenance of positive commitment.  The 
presence of a number of lessor negative peaks, and smoother peaks has demonstrated that 
changes and variations in the InstnPow and InstnUncern variables affect the commitment 
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The varied responses of the agent groups are a result of their varied institutional settings, 
that is, the stages that they were and are at in the matrix of institutional dimensions, and 
the relative importance their institutional influence plays within their environment.   
Given that each agent group is positioned in dissimilar dimensions of the matrix (i.e., in 
the pre and post expansion phases in EU membership) and have distinct levels of 
influential institutional importance, it is not unexpected that disharmony in EU financial 
accounting eventuated and persists today.   
 
5.3 Statistical  Analysis 
 
A statistical analysis of the overall commitment values for all agent groups is now 
necessary to complement the visual analysis performed and to provide the numerical 
grounding for the visual results.  Results from the simulation (Table 1) appear broadly in 
line with the current condition of harmonisation in the EU.  Mean EU commitment falls 
slightly from 0.061 to 0.52.  Individual commitment values are widely dispersed but 
narrow with expansion (except for the Anglo Saxon group), with overall variance of 
0.204 for part one and 0.130 for part two.   
 
Table 1 - Descriptives of Final Commitment (finalcomm (Ca)) Values from Simulation One and Two 
Simulation Part 
and Agent Types 
Minimum Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation  Variance 
Part One  -.86283 .97267 .06061 .45176 .204
Part Two  -.86124 .95350 .05182 .36037 .130
Anglo Saxon Part 1  -.86069 .90969 .02686 .44036 .194
Anglo Saxon Part 2  -.86124 .90343 .02244 .45197 .204
Germanic Part 1  -.86283 .95344 .03671 .60957 .372
Germanic Part 2  -.84046 .95350 .06479 .42408 .180
Latin Part 1  -.80091 .97267 .10086 .35109 .123
Latin Part 2  -.65233 .72460 .05977 .24954 .062
Nordic Part 1  -.75000 .89374 .07802 .35279 .124
Nordic Part 2  -.75535 .79321 .06027 .26874 .072
Source: Temel 2005: 290 
 
 
Table 1 also provides dispersion details for each nation or agent group.  It is at their 
means and variances that the agent groups vary significantly.  The Anglo Saxon agent 
group and Germanic group varying significantly in comparison to that of the Latin and Articulating Principals, Agents and Institutions in the EU 
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Nordic groups (refer to Table 1; the variance column).  Given that the Anglo Saxon and 
Germanic agent groups were of those in strong opposition to the method and system to be 
used in harmonisation, the variability in commitment is expected.  The Latin and Nordic 
groups, on the other hand, being more relaxed sought to achieve commitment with little 
reluctance and hence, have varied less in their efforts.   
 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
12 presented in Table 2 below confirms that 
there is significant difference among the mean final commitment values of the agent 
groups in part one and part two of the simulation – that is, the final commitment values 
exhibited is related to agent group types.  This analysis has thus demonstrated that each 
agent group has a varied level of final commitment even with all group agents facing 
similar circumstances/conditions and with the addition of new members.  This is 
synonymous with the current status of EU attempts towards financial accounting 
harmonisation.  Each nation in the EU has assigned themselves a different level of 
commitment towards harmonisation through the Directive procedures they have chosen 
to implement informed by their institutions.  There is no uniformity in commitment 
towards harmonisation.  This is likely to continue to be the case even with the planned 
and further addition of new members into the EU.  The relativity of the nations’ 
circumstances proves to be driving force not the numbers.       
 
Table 2 - ANOVA of Two Analyses of Variances for Each Simulation Part 
Simulation Parts  Sum of Squares  Df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
Part One 
Between Groups  4.396 3 1.465 7.207 .000
Within Groups  983.181 4836 .203
Total 987.577 4839
Part Two 
Between Groups  1.411 3 .470 3.628 .012
Within Groups  627.002 4836 .130
Total 628.413 4839
Source: Temel (2005: 291) 
                                                 
12 In performing the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests, a p-value less then the 5 per cent level of 
significance would indicate that the value for the F statistic is significantly large and thus, the null 
hypothesis would need to be rejected and the alternate hypothesis accepted.  The null hypothesis here is 
that there are no significant differences between the agent group variances in commitment values.   
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6.  Implications for Harmonisation  
 
6.1 EU  Financial Accounting  
 
The results presented above demonstrate that the EU case for financial accounting 
harmonisation is synonymous with the socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA) 
conceptualisation of agent behaviour.  A number of implications follow.    
 
The first of the implications to be examined pertains to the articulation of the EU case 
using the extended conceptualisation of agent behaviour.  The articulation has 
demonstrated that the institutions within EU member states have been effective in 
influencing the direction of European integration. These developments have serious 
implications for the future of the EU and for European integration in general.  This is 
especially the case with the ongoing widening and deepening of the EU.  Unless efforts 
are directed towards appreciating the varying differences in institutional influence efforts 
towards harmonisation within the EU will be in constant disarray.   
 
European financial reporting will remain fragmented, thereby hampering the 
development of a deep liquid single EU capital market.  Diversity in financial accounting 
practices affects the capital market decisions of investors and issuers acting as a restraint 
on cross-boarder investment much like a non-tariff barrier and thus, handicapping the 
development of the single capital market.  As a method of corporate communication, an 
investor may be reluctant to buy shares if he or she finds the accounts strange and 
mystifying in comparison to their home country accounts.  Alternatively, a European 
company may be reluctant to raise capital else where in Europe if it has to spend 
resources adapting its accounts for French investors. With the widening and deepening of 
economic integration in the EU, the inconsistency in EU financial accounting practices 
could be substantially harmful. Regions of disparity with regards to finance are 
established. 
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6.2 Wider  implications 
 
This brings to questions the issues outside financial accounting harmonisation, those 
pertaining to trade laws, environmental laws and land and water usage.  Financial 
accounting harmonisation in the EU can serve as an example from which to extrapolate.  
The variability present in efforts towards attaining a uniform system of financial 
accounting, due to institutional differences, serve as an indicative measurement of 
harmonisation on alternative fronts.  For example, the development of the single 
monetary union (SMU) represents an interesting case, or even the implementation of food 
standards across the EU, and allocation of community aid both represent troubling areas 
across the EU.  Disparate regions have been established in the EU that are more 
conducive and lucrative to growth, investment and trade based on their stance towards 
uniformly implemented rules (converse is true).  For example, a member nation with a 
strong presence of the environmental preservation is more likely to strictly adhere to the 
regulations preserving land and water than a member nation with a weaker presence.  
This strict adherence imposes higher costs for industrial growth. 
 
With the accelerating pace of business, the need for a more dynamic and responsive 
legislative framework for unification of European regions is ever increasing.  It is 
important, particularly for reasons of ongoing performance and cohesion, that each 
Member State move towards harmonisation at a pace appropriate to that individual 
country.  Change through the implication of uniform standards can not be enforced but 
rather facilitated through understanding the influential factors responsible for instigating 
and responding to change.   This could be an effective means through which a joint goal 
can be ascertained in the diverse regions within the EU. 




An innovative exploration of a principal-agent situation which uses object-based concepts 
and simulations was presented in this paper.  Different patterns of agent commitment are 
seen when it is applied to a European context.  The extent of this is dependent upon the 
institutionally specific variables of institutional power and institutional variability. Both 
variables presented varied effects upon agent groups. 
 
The SERA conceptualisation of agent behaviour appears to have wide implications and 
applications.  Its further development will allow more adequate specification of agency 
situations with immediate implications for policy and practice not only in Europe but in 
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